Land Value Tax

We've seen much over recent weeks about how awful the City has been. How banks have made rash dodgy loans. Short sellers, overpaid executives and whatever else...

But I'll let you into a little secret: for every loan there is both a lender, perhaps a dodgy spiv with too high a bonus to be sure, but just as importantly there has also to be a borrower.

We have seen a little po-faced political bemoaning of the culture of consumer debt, but this unsecured credit - spending money - does not appear to be the primary debt that has caused this collapse. With few exceptions, when the banks talk about the sub-prime loans lying like a half-dead half-back at the base of a maul, they are talking about mortgages. Are not these borrowers to be condemned in equal proportion? Did the bankers force them to borrow? Are not they just as greedy, in their own way, as the bankers making themselves rich on those borrowers' seeming insatiable demands for more money? Maybe these are the real "sub-prime loons" that are really responsible for bringing our economies near to systemic collapse?

Of course it would be electoral suicide to lay so much blame on the ordinary "Joe Sixpack, the hockey mom". And indeed it would be quite wrong to do so. For most of those mortgage borrowers, perhaps especially what has become known, horribly disparagingly, as the "sub-prime" borrowers, were being completely rational. Rational, that is, in an utterly irrational system. And the results of that rational behaviour are now serving to highlight just how irrational the system is.

Indeed, it is so utterly irrational a system that those borrowers we might want instinctively accuse of being the least rational - those whose chances of paying off the large loans were the smallest - are in fact the most rational. Because in that mad upward spiral of house prices, those still left renting would be the worst hit. The urgency of getting out of renting and fixing your future housing costs at today's rates is all the more pressing.

Because here's the second little secret for tonight: we all rent.

This may seem counter-intuitive in a world where 70% of folk "own" their home and most of the rest want to. If you are, or can recall when you were, on the point of making the transition from renting to buying the first time, this will be easier to understand. One of the factors in your decision to stop renting and to buy instead will have been whether the mortgage payments, as compared with your current rent payments, are reasonable value, over the length of time you expect to be needing to use that property.

Of course there are many other factors as well. Some in favour of ownership, such as being able to improve, redecorate or even trash the property, and having the prospect of capital growth. Some in favour of renting, such as not being responsible for all the maintenance, or not being stuck with a mill stone if you can't sell it when you need to move. And of course the supreme benefits: a. you don't need to charge yourself rent - after all you are paying for it anyway and b. if you get to the end of your payments okay, you get it rent free for as long as you like and still get to sell the rights to it hopefully at a tidy profit.

But as tradable assets, our properties are valued on the basis of the yield it could achieve to an investment buyer now, and their view of how that is going to change over the time they expect to hold the investment. And when we buy a home, what we are actually buying is the right to collect the rent on that property for several years ahead at a "fixed" price today that we think will benefit us. Few owner occupier buyers will probably think about it that clinically. They might instead look at local comparisons to assess what they ought to be willing to pay. But so long as there is a rental market, and since there are some disbenefits to ownership as noted above it is likely that there will always remain a rental market, the money-value to the market is going to be based on its current and future rental potential and the overall yield over the time an investor would expect to hold that property investment.

So, what rising house prices indicate is that investors believe that there are going to be higher returns in terms of future rent potential. And if you are still a tenant, higher returns to the landlord mean higher costs to you. So if it is economic to freeze the rent payments at or near today's levels for the foreseeable future, you definitely want to do so. This becomes a bubble because the effect of future expectations compounds itself. Throw in relatively cheap loans and people can afford more in the present to secure those expected future gains.

Okay, now having, I hope, got you thinking in terms of "rent" I want to get you thinking about the different components of this "rent".

Take two identical, some might call them identikit, homes. Two same model "Barratt boxes". Only one is in Kensington & Chelsea, the other in Blaenau Gwent. I choose them because they are the highest and the lowest respectively local authorities by "land value" in England and Wales. Three bedroom, 100 sq m and with a rebuild cost of £1500 per sq m. On the face of it, they ought to cost about the same to buy, somewhere around £150,000, but of course they don't, do they.

If you managed to find the same little plot in K&C as in Blaenau on which to place your "Barratt box" you'd probably find that in Blaenau it would cost next to nothing - probably a couple of thousand pound per plot, for the trouble of clearing it! But in K&C it would cost several million and probably wouldn't be worth your while putting that Barratt box on it! In fact, in the recent purchase of Chelsea Barracks by the Candy brothers, which was reported as £959m for 12.8 acres, your average tenth of an acre plot would set you back a cool £7.3 million.

In fact, the Chelsea Barracks site is a good one to look at, since it will not involve criticizing the "poor widow" for not developing her prime land, but the government! What did the government, the Ministry of Defence do to make that barracks land so valuable? It certainly wasn't its former use as a barracks! It's not because it was a barracks that makes it an in demand site. But because of all the economic and social activity that goes on around the site. In fact, once upon a time, as a barracks, no doubt the site would have attracted the usual motley collection of military hangers on - whore-houses, bars and so on - it may even have depressed local land values initially, but certainly for the past few decades holding it out of its more productive use has meant other local prices have been pushed higher than they would be if all that land had been used productively.

In fact, the proportion of the "rent" due to the value of the building, the same sort of building as in Blaenau, is a tiny fraction of the overall rent. The rest is due to the location. The popularity of a location which is made up of dozens of factors, but centres around the fact that there are hundreds, thousands, of people who could beneficially make use of that location to be nearer work, social and other opportunities created by the surrounding community.

Now, here's the easy part to remember. What Land Value Taxers want to see, from David Ricardo, Adam Smith, J S Mill, Henry George to Lloyd-George, Churchill, Asquith and many others to the present day, is that the portion of the rent a property yields due to its location, and not the building on it, should be collected by the community and redistributed amongst the community instead of privatised by the highest bidder (or in some cases still the person with the most brutal land grabbing ancestor!), shored up by cheap bank loans. It is rent due to its monopoly as a good location that many people could make use of rather than any effort of the landowner.

In an LVT based tax system, when you "buy" your home, you'd be buying the right to collect the rent for the building alone. This is something you as an owner can affect, through your diligence or negligence in maintaining it or in building something of higher density on the same site. In the language that a typical home buyer will understand better, we want you to pay the £150,000 for the Barratt box to Barratt or the previous occupier, but you pay the remainder, the rent caused by its location, in annually assessed chunks, to the state instead of paying taxes on the earnings from your economically productive labour.

You can already, I hope, see the advantages. This bubble we have lived through over the past decade, the angst of people priced out of the market stressing about if they ever will get out of renting, the ballooning of borrowing that now threatens the very system that created it, will be things of the past. For as long as you can justify paying the location rent given the benefits that particular location gives you nobody can shift you. If that rent rises it is a sign that more and more people are being excluded from land that they might make more productive use of than you. Why should you be able to exclude them for as long as you like and then also reap a massive profit from having cost so many others much money "avoiding" your plot?

Instead of that home in Kensington & Chelsea costing you £7.35 million up front, it'll cost you £150,000 or so up front, which you can borrow to pay for if you need to, and a hefty annual location rent bill instead of both the remaining £7.2 m mortgage it would have cost you to buy the location up front and your income and other taxes on productive labour. Your disposable income is likely to be maybe 30% higher just for losing those income taxes. You can save in a wider range of productive assets for your future than just the monopolistic endeavour of owning a popular, or up and coming location. You may even choose to save so you can continue to pay the location rent when you stop earning for whatever reason - though most would probably find it just as good to save for an income in retirement and to downsize or move so that someone else can have the benefit of the local school you no longer use, the local rail station you no longer commute from and whatever other factors have made your location a popular one and for the proximity of which you would continue to pay even after you have stopped using them.

In the lingo, this is called creating "free land". Returning it to common ownership and paying as you go to occupy the bit that most suits you at any particular time of your life.

Even apart from the source of government revenue this would provide (though some of us would prefer to see the rent collected and simply doled out to all citizens in that community as a community dividend, a basic universal non-withdrawable income in place of most cash benefits) it fundamentally shifts the burden away from working and producing and onto inefficient use of scarce resources.

It is essential in an environmentally responsible regime, because it makes the choice of whether to live close and not pollute by commuting or to live far and spend a fortune in travel costs, more available to more people.

And it is essential in a liberal regime, as it gives people a choice in the "taxes" they pay - the tax savvy will soon work out that if they can spot an up and coming area that still meets their needs early they will pay less tax and watch the services there get better as others catch on, until it reaches some kind of equilibrium again. And it stop people making monopoly profits out of excluding others from what we all need access to - a location to base ourselves at.

This would be so much more than just a "tax switch" though - it would so fundamentally change the fairness, equit, economic justice for millions of people who, knowingly or not, are trapped in a system that takes money from them to line the pockets of landowners, the ranks of whom are getting ever more distant for many people all the time.

One of the most common points of disagreement between, let's call them "state-interventionists" and "non-interventionists", is the claim that "non-interventionism" would leave the poorest in society on the scrap heap with no welfare, no support. That the much vaunted idea of "non-interventionists" that "private charity" or "voluntary co-operation" would take the place of state welfare is just an impossible pipe dream. So determinedly do "state-interventionists" believe their own claims that they frequently castigate "non-interventionists" as heartless uncaring selfish individualists who would rather see others die than pay taxes. One quote from a Lib Dem Voice "discussion" just today will give you the general idea:

"Well none of them [Libertarians] are serious, because it an incoherent philosophy....send the kids back down the mines, it’s only a lifestyle choice."

And to an extent, I used to believe that propaganda. As a geo-libertarian of course I do have an answer of sorts - the basic income derived from land user fees (which would on their own create an almost unimaginably more equitable society in any case) would cover the basics of life for everyone, and give everyone an incentive to top it up with as much or as little work as they can manage.

But a recent discussion on a "non-interventionist" mailing list I've been frequenting recently has challenged the basic assumption of this debate for me. Would people really not contribute voluntarily to the upkeep of others if you don't have a government apparatus threatening them with the confiscation of their property and ultimately the loss of their freedom unless they pay their taxes?

It is a strange proposition. Governments for at least the last sixty years have been supporters at some level or another of some form of state welfare. They may argue about how much is appropriate but the fact is, people have overwhelmingly voted for a state that takes money from you in order to give some of what's yours to someone deemed "less fortunate". We even have a cliche about the inevitability of death, and taxes.

We have tens, maybe hundreds of thousands of people who do voluntarily give up their time to care for another. Most people are someone's relative, someone's friend, someone's colleague. And whilst I recognize that some do not have such support networks and would still require some form of collective support, most people do not want to see their friends and relatives on skid row or worse.

One has to wonder whether the interventionist route actually makes things worse. And in how many ways. When we look at our pay packets do we not think often that we've given quite enough for the support of others through our taxes thank you very much. National Insurance and Income Tax between them effectively make the worker near forty per cent worse off. I know what I would do with an extra forty per cent each month. It would pay the interest bill on the piece of land we have just acquired for our first Community Land Trust for a start.

Other taxes and protectionist policies keep the prices we pay for basics artificially high and create incentives for companies to produce cash cows rather than exciting developments. I'll bet if we didn't guarantee one pharmaceutical company a contract for however many millions of doses of Metformin diabetes pills every year a dozen others would have put the effort in to find a cure, not a chronic treatment regime.

The attempt to do welfare as a "universal" system, with the same rules for everyone, means a bloated bureaucracy enforcing inflexible regulations. If welfare were, say, to be dealt with at the parish level, and the barriers to job creation caused by taxes eradicated, I'll bet you more people would be found some work, appropriate to their abilities, even if it didn't give them everything they need and then people would feel much better about helping them out with the rest - because they were trying to help themselves as best they could. We have no way of measuring that at a national level really.

We have a Professor here at Brookes, a chap called Steven King. His area is the History of Welfare mostly in the 18th and 19th centuries - probably the period which received wisdom says was the harshest environment if you were poor or hapless. But I was fascinated by a lecture he gave a couple of years ago on being elevated to the professoriate (you are elevated to that aren't you?). Apparently when parishes were responsible for pensions, those who actually got a pension - those whom their own peers and neighbours if you like knew had simply tried and been unable to support themselves (in common parlance I guess the "deserving poor") would get on average 75% of the average working wage for their area. For others there were varying levels of support down to a pretty basic safety net that was intended to be subsistence rather than comfortable for those they felt were "swinging the lead".

And then there's the problem of administrative costs. If I had an extra 40% in my pay packet and was going to give it away, I'd know that the people or organizations I was giving it to would get all of my donation. I'll bet for the 40% the state apparatus take off me in taxes, probably half actually gets to someone who needs it, to direct service delivery, if that.

So, given all those disadvantages of, and the singular advantage that people actually vote for, this tax based welfare system at some level or another, is it not just possible that by doing away with all that coercion, all that centralization, all that unproductive bureaucracy, the people who get to keep what they earn would be quite proud to "do the right thing" by their neighbours and communities? If they vote at the ballot box to have money taken off them by the state for things they obviously believe are necessary, would they suddenly feel they were not necessary or that they should not contribute towards those same things without the threats of the state?  Isn't that a totally illogical position?  You'd vote for it but not do it if the people you vote for didn't force you to do it?

And so, at the very least, would it not be at least a courtesy to accept that Libertarianism is an optimistic creed; that it is positive about humanity's innate ability and even need to help each other. You may call that a naive optimism. But I'd rather be a glass half full freedom lover than the glass half empty authoritarian approach that says humanity will not help itself unless it is forced to do so by the agents of a state apparatus that may, just may, cause more problems than it actually solves. Libertarian is not a "devil may care/beggar thy neighbour" philosophy but one that places the utmost faith in people, as individuals, to know and do what is right.

And as to whether it is a "coherent philosophy" or not, I submit that "non-interventionism" is the only truly coherent philosophy in the game. For once you admit the state can do one thing better than we can through voluntary co-operation, you inevitably end up in endless arguments between factions about just how much the state can do better, and the ultimate end of that arms race is totalitarianism - that the state can do everything better than voluntary co-operation. Which is manifestly not true.

The Competition Commission has suggested, perhaps commanded (I no longer know what sort of power the CC has given that most competition issues are meant to be dealt with on a Europe-wide basis) that BAA ought to sell some of its airports, and in particular two of the three main London ones. I am uneasy about this for two main reasons...

First off I am deeply suspicious about the timing of the Competition Commission's investigation which seemed to be a (possibly coincidental) reaction to those foreigners (Ferrovial) taking over a British company which had owned those airports for a significant time. If there was a problem with monopoly, surely it should have been taken into account when BAA was first privatised.

And second it is a big step to try and force someone to divest themselves of their own property, especially when it's not as if they are "absentee landlords" but working, and presumably working quite successfully (other than the debt burden) the property.

But there is another problem. The monopoly is not really about the airports themselves - and indeed making them compete directly by being owned by separate owners wanting to maximise their income from each individual airport is likely I would have thought to result in heavier use of all of them, increasing the discomfort for the folk who have to live as neighbours of these smelly, filthy, noisy facilities.

It is exacerbated by the fact that what they really control is access to the airlanes that supply those airports. Airlanes that are, in the economic sense, "land" - part of "unimproved" natural resources with finite space - and in this case also time - (though of course safety technologies can increase the capacity a little) for all the potential users. This is part of the commons, and Ferrovial/BAA and the longer established airlines profit directly from the monopolistic enclosure of those airlanes.

Like the Electromagnetic Spectrum they are part of the "commons" and should be leased at their full economic rent from the state for our collective benefit. They are most commonly called "landing slots" and are worth a huge amount of money - Deloittes reckons that peak day time slots at Heathrow are worth up to £30 million per pair in summer, and there are 9,562 (4,781 pairs - one to land and one to take off on) per week in high season, with an overall limit of 480,000 per year at the moment.

The slot situation is currently, by common consent, pretty chaotic. The government has capped the amount BAA can charge and capped the amount by which it can increase the charge, but 97% of all slots at Heathrow for example are not open to effective competition as they are sold at this capped cost to airlines who have been there the longest, so called "grandfather rights". Heathrow is the only airport in Europe at which there is a significant amount of secondary trading in a "grey" market which is where the £30 million per pair arises. All this profit, the economic rent, goes to the airlines and Deloittes goes on to calculate that BA's slot portfolio may be worth up to £2bn if it were included in its balance sheet as an asset compared with its market capitalisation of around £2.7bn!

The CAA should be auctioning airspace rights to all airports at whatever the market will pay, whilst airports themselves should be responsible for charging the airlines for the use of the "improvements" - the terminal access, ground facilities and so on.

This would force traffic that doesn't actually need to use these massively oversubscribed London airports out to existing regional airports first, often reducing travel times - why travel from Lancaster to London to get a plane if the destination you want is available more cheaply from Manchester - as well as bringing increased economic activity to the areas around those regional airports - airports are a huge draw for international businesses. And unless the overall capacity of slots convenient for travelers' points of origin and destination is actually more than required, would generate a goodly sum for the government in a more market efficient way than say fuel taxes.

I hope we will be having a debate at South Central regional conference on Heathrow's third runway proposals. I believe the rigorous eradicating of this money for nothing monopoly on the part of the airports and airlines through nationwide slot auctions would actually obviate the need for the extra imposition this third runway would cause on teh surrounding areas without affecting overall the competitiveness of Heathrow for flights that really need to use it.

Again, I'm starting a new post to respond to some very interesting comments by Tim Carpenter. My inept attempt at a Drupal template means it's almost possible to follow a thread of comments and especially given this is going to be another long response I think it deserves an airing on its own.

For anyone coming new to this debate, it follows on from my original "three point plan" for equity and economic justice and some clarifications and responses I gave yesterday to comments on that original by Tim Carpenter, Head of Policy at the Libertarian Party UK.

Tim, thanks for taking the time to respond. However I think we are, as a colleague used to say to me "talking past each one another". Paul Lockett has put it all a deal more eloquently than myself , and for that, and if I have caused any confusion, apologies.

I am a geo-libertarian (of the "geo-mutualist" variety if you will). The main thing you seem not to have appreciated is that in calling for the "Single Tax" I mean just that - the community/state can only take economic rent on the land resources within its jurisdiction and has no call on incomes or trade. As I understand it this is the "purist Georgist" position.

The ideal 'state' would be limited to collecting the rent and distributing it all as a dividend to citizens for the reasons Paul outlined. "Commonwealth" - you are right, it's lazy, I should put a space between "common" and "wealth"! Economic rent from the finite natural resources we all require to share is "common wealth" and should be collected as such and distributed as fully as possible whilst every other tax is a tariff.

Tim: "1. When I say who defines the value of your land, you say "why does anyone need to decide", yet immediately go on to talk about collecting the tax! Someone DOES decide the taxable value and that affects the actual value. Can you not see that?"

No, the market sets a location's value. It does it all the time at the moment. And it will continue to do so in an LVT system. Even in a "100% LVT" system. If a location is appreciating in value, buyers will be prepared to pay a premium over last year's rent bill and vice versa, in a falling market sellers will effectively have to be prepared to pay someone to take the rent bill off them. The following year's rent bill will reflect that premium or discount by going up or down respectively.

Tim: "2. As you should know, we aim to eradicate income tax., so the comparison does not hold."

See above - I'm a single taxer. No income tax here either. It is a tariff on employment and trade. Though I would say that if a local community decided mutually to have a local tax on incomes or sales to finance some mutually agreed local project it would be doing so in competition with neighbouring communities that perhaps were not or were charging a different rate or a different tax. Tax competition is good, in itself, isn't it? Also I am aware of some "single" taxers who would justify retaining some income tax at least temporarily in order to try to address the "embedded" historical advantages of monopoly ownership. I don't.

Tim: "The problem comes when some local area under the influence of whomsoever, adjusts taxation on land they wish to gain access to because a new development is coming. So, building a road, whack up the value of land next to it. Farmer has no CAPITAL to develop it, so has to sell it for a knock-down price because he HAS to sell to meet the tax bill. If this does not concentrate land into a few hands, I do no know what would. This is just one example of the potential risks."

This appears to be Churchill's "market gardener" bogey, or, to others, the "poor widow" bogey. If you look at it under the current system, that same farmer, in similar circumstances is perfectly able, regardless of the squalor growing around, to sit on that land, not paying anything and watch its value "ripen" until the value, created merely by excluding others from what they need to use, is so great it becomes irrational not to sell. That process is outright extortion.

In fact, under an LVT system, land values at the margin would tend to move much more incrementally in any case. In the absence of other restrictions - zoning, green belts etc (it is your policy to remove those restrictions once an LVT system proves practical isn't it?) - you would not get these large leaps in hope value. I would actually retain green belts and such like for a while after LVT was implemented so that it can have its greatest effect in turning existing urban land to its most efficient use before going for sprawl. But I am prepared to be convinced on that. After all, we know that at relatively low densities compared with what planning guidance seeks nowadays, it would take up less than three quarters of one per cent of the non urbanized land in England to build the three million new homes predicted to be necessary over the next twenty years.

But once a point of equilibrium was reached between supply and demand rents at the margins of production would move slowly and via the democratic influence of the market. If that market and the community that makes up its participants eventually get as far as that farmer's land and all that remains to bring it in from the margin to profitable development is to develop a road, the farmer will have had plenty of opportunity to see it coming long before the tax bill becomes an issue for him.

Tim: "3. Living costs - if you have CBI as described you would still keep the most expensive parts of the Welfare bureaucracy - the entire means-testing apparatus. Housing benefit would probably remain in all but name."

I disagree. But I don't think what you understand me to have described is what I think I have! ie, in particular, that I am not paying for CBI out of income taxes, but out of the community collected rent on economic land. Land at the margins tends as I said towards a nil value. More people will be able to own their home because they will not be borrowing twice as much as the value of the capital good (the building) in order to pay the land value in up front capital. Renting a basic home at the margins ought to be achievable out of the Citizens Income.

With so many pulled out of poverty anyway by not having punitive benefits withdrawal regimes that reduce the marginal value of doing even the smallest amount of paid work and by the reduced costs of living owing to tariff eradication and the better off keeping more of their own money, the capacity of private charity or local mutualism to assist the much smaller number of people that would be needing top up hand outs above their CBI would be much increased.

Tim: "4. Income. You need to clarify here - are you saying that COMPANIES have 40% more or that wage earners do? Be under no illusions, if you have CBI, income tax will be enormous. I worked out once that if we went for CBI with no other tax changes but a cull of QANGOs, income tax would need to be about 64% flat from the very first penny (IT is currently £140bln, 7k x 50m = £350bln pa). A HUGE disincentive to working especially at the lower end. Result: black economy, unproductive citizens, more companies shutting down and a growth in imports (and do not say "cheap imports make us richer" because that only holds if we are simultaneously exporting a greater amount of higher value exports)."

I hope you'll agree that that objection is moot given I am not talking about income taxes at all. My calculation of the CBI cost at £5200 pa for adults and a decreasing proportion for under-18s to 20% for 2 year olds is around £285bn. £245bn if only the adults. I reckon there was about £200bn a year's worth of economic rent in residential land alone at the recent peak of the market. I don't think it is beyond belief that there's another £85bn in commercial, industrial, retail and, possibly, agricultural economic rents.

Tim: "5. Movement to low tax areas: A company will consider workforce supply as a prime consideration, not just rental costs. If that were not the case, expensive London would be empty. People pay top dollar for London rents because of a massive pool of labour - they can gain access to many cheap or more chance of snaring the best. To think LVT would make a company move out to a depressed area? Those places are already cheap. Why doesn't it happen now? Limited skilled labour pool. As you say the Government does it now and did it in the past (remember the Hillman Imp?) and it creates quasi-soviets. If LVT has an influence, it might IMHO move a few companies, deter some from even setting up where they need to and the rest of the companies will be bled paying higher rates just to keep near the labour pool they require. In the case of London, the move will be to New York or Hong Kong and we all lose out."

There are so many issues in this paragraph I can only assume again that I have failed adequately to have explained my position. At the moment businesses pay rents, yes? In an LVT system they will still pay rents. The only difference is that whereas currently the entire rent, that which accrues to both the building and the site or location goes to the current landowner, ie it is enclosed, privatized. Under an LVT system, the same rent is due (assuming they were paying the market rent originally), only the portion of it that accrues to the location goes to the community and that attributable to the building to the building owner. There's no corporation taxes, no more employee taxes. There's no increasing of rent or rates; there's no bleeding anyone. Except those, as landowners, who have bled the rest of us for centuries.

Areas of low land value will also be areas in which it is cheaper for employees to live (lower LVT for them too). For a business operating at the edge of profit it would seem to me to be quite an attractive move. But one that remains in London because their key skills are there is not penalised by that. Indeed, if sufficient other businesses do it who do not need to be in London for optimal profitability do move, costs will also likely fall for those left behind, increasing their profit, distributable to capital and labour.

I think there is, in particular, one form of LVT that could have a significant effect in this regard...the auctioning of air-space, via "landing slots" at airports. Making more efficient use of regional airports would draw business into those areas. I'm likely to propose this to our regional conference this autumn as part of an "anti third runway at Heathrow" motion. Interesting choices of examples though - Hong Kong of course is famous for having state owned land - everything except the Anglican Cathedral is leasehold and that has been used to raise revenue in a form of LVT and keep income taxes low. Modern valuation tracking and billing systems would make that far more efficient and not prone to some of the problems Hong Kong suffered by having too infrequent valuations.

In China before Mao took over, I understand that Chiang Kai Chek's regime looked into LVT as a way of staving off the rise of Mao's totalitarian collectivism. And in the former Soviet Union, Gorbachev I believe looked into LVT as a way of capturing the value of natural resources and in not implementing it allowed the so called "oligarchs" (really "kleptocrats" in my opinion) to enclose the revenue from that vast pool of common wealth.

I'm getting a bit tired here! I'm going to call it quite at this point and maybe think some more about the issue of mutualism. I think Paul answered the point about the "state as landlord" objections quite satisfactorily and there's no need for me to repeat it. But for fairness, other readers can read Tim's further points in the comments on the previous post.

Tim: "p.s. your page has a script that my browser asks me to kill due to risk of resource hogging."

Yes - I only notice this on older machines or slower network connections - I never experience the problem at home or at work. I think it must have been an advertising panel I have just removed, but if others still experience the problem let me know and I'll have another look.