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The Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services was published on 2nd December, 1942, in the depths of World War II. The committee, under its chair, the liberal economist Sir William Beveridge, had been established by the wartime government to plan ahead for the challenges of reconstruction of the national fabric after the war.

The report identified what it called the "Five giants on the road to reconstruction: Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness". Each was to be enjoined in battle by a major plank of the post-war welfare state - social security, the NHS, expanded state education, the nationwide house building schemes that would produce "homes fit for heros" and Keynesian style economic stimulus programs to maintain high employment respectively. That National Health Service Act of 1946 brought into existence, sixty years ago last week on 5th July 1948, what has become Europe's largest employer, the NHS.

The Beveridge Report indeed made much of its wartime heritage. The war was a turning point in history that deserved revolutionary measures afterwards to ensure peaceful and equitable reconstruction. The battle ahead was couched in terms of a "war on want" (and the others of the "Five Giants"). But as my former university chancellor (as of Friday), news anchor Jon Snow, often says, you cannot win a "war on a noun".

So how has the NHS, and the other key planks of the welfare state mentioned, fared in this "war"? It seems obvious that we have not, sixty years on, beaten any of those giants:

Want: we have a society in which the least well off are dependent on the state. If you believe such things matter, and I do, still a fifth of children grow up in relative poverty and the gap between the wealthiest and poorest is larger than ever. Not only that, but as as with "idleness" many are actually trapped in that dependency, facing the highest penalties if they actually manage to find themselves work that might remove them from that dependency in the form of punitive benefits withdrawals rates. None of the myriad benefits in the system are sufficient on their own to sustain life (particularly the pension, now in its hundredth year), so people are often on multiple benefit regimes.

Disease: whilst quite obviously the range of ailments that are now routinely cured or treated is a huge step on from 1948, there is still a six month waiting list for almost any kind of surgery, hundreds of people denied drugs even their own NHS doctors believe may help them, and the whole headless structure is running around trying to meet centrally set targets, which are fundamentally opposed to the founding principles of the NHS - that it should be responsive to particular local needs. In parts of Glasgow East constituency male life expectancy is lower than in some developing countries for example, which, whether it is an improvement on the state of play in 1948 or not is a pretty terrible indictment.

Ignorance: the state education system has become more comprehensive and more centralized. Students are of course now paying for tuition fees in tertiary education, and we see a constant stream of stories from universities and business leaders saying that many people leaving school are functionally illiterate. The most well off are still using private education and the least well off, as Nick Clegg has constantly complained about, seem condemned to inner city sink schools often with little aspiration planted in their heads.

Squalor: this one was primarily about housing. Sure, we had a post-war building boom but now that's looking quite hollow. In fifty years, the UK's housing has become smaller; the only developed nation on the planet where that is the case - elsewhere increased affluence has seen larger, more comfortable homes. If you are stuck on a sink estate, you probably have as much chance as in 1948 of escaping it. Even the right to buy has often failed to give people who were persuaded that buying their fifties built prefabricated type semi (such as the Orlits design currently being demolished all over Oxford) a meaningful asset. And we are in a situation where those who aspire to ownership currently have little hope of being able to afford it.

...and finally Idleness: it is very difficult for work to help the poorest when getting a job can mean lots of hassles with your various benefits and a punitive regime of clawing back those benefits such that you are often effectively earning very little indeed for all the effort of getting a job in the first place and going out to work once you have. And actually I would argue that we want more "idleness". I realize that in the report "idleness" is something either down to the laziness of the individual, or more likely a state enforced on one by lack of work opportunities in the economy. However as we get closer to the ideal of having many menial jobs and tasks done for us by machines, the idea that the only way of gaining purchasing power with which to participate in the complicated world economy is through work should be rethought in any case. It is nothing to crow about that people still have to remain wage slaves in order to achieve some measure of financial security.

So, on a purely cursory glance, these five "wars" are not going well sixty years on. Some battles have been won, and clearly some things are better in so many ways than it would have been at the end of World War II. But some of the problems are as intractable as ever, others are almost victims of their own successes; for example some of the problems of the NHS of course stem from them now being able to treat far more problems than previously and so creating more demand for itself. But I'd go one step further, and say that the weapons deployed in these various wars have in fact entrenched dependency, reduced choice, stifled innovation and competition. Not only that, but they are hugely expensive, now between them consuming not far off half of all our national income and may be suffering from the law of diminishing returns.

It is time we realized that the approach is itself wrong. That, as Einstein said, "We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them".

...so, what can we do ...?

Over at ConservativeHome they're spinning the line that "Green Taxes" such as those that might be recommended by the Gummer-Goldssmith review might hit the poorest hardest:

Green action mustn't punish the poor. Green taxation - like the congestion charge and VAT on domestic flights - can fall most heavily on the poorest.

Zac Goldsmith: Green taxes
must not appear to be the rich
telling the poor what
they cannot have!

According to our figures I think they need to look either at who would be most affected, or who they are calling the poorest. It would of course not surprise any of us to find that they don't really count the really poorest as poor, just the "lower middle classes" from whom they want some votes. But, if they do mean the lowest rungs of the British wealth ladder, then according to the line that Chris Huhne, Green Lib Dems and other have been pushing it is not in fact these people who would be most affected.

33% of households do not have access to a car. Most of these are the least well off households. If money from the congestion charge puts more into public transport these people gain. Similarly I very much doubt that the very poorest, if they travel terribly far at all, travel by air, internally or overseas. These are the "National Express" customers if anything. It would cost me more in time, money and effort to get to a cheap flight airport before flying as it would be to get a coach service to my destination. And on overseas flights, it is the well off and moderately well off who can afford to take multiple breaks a year. The European city weekend break several times a year is not the stuff of the Housing Benefit claimant (unless he's also an MEP I suppose).

However, they are right about one thing, yet fail to address it. Green taxes will hurt the poor the most if the poor are always driven to living on "marginal land". For it is they who, as well as having to keep up their housing costs, will have to commute because housing prices near where they work or socialize are unaffordable to them. Only Land Value Tax, as I wrote in one of my first ever blog posts, can change that and give people a real choice as to whether to live closer to work or commute with the attendant higher travel costs that green taxation will bring.

The Tories therefore, like all the other main parties including the Lib Dems, signally fail to address the biggest environmental tax issue of all - the taxation of location values.

The bird on the acompanying recording has been singing now for about an hour - ie from 1am onwards. Can anyone tell me what it is?

NB - don't turn it up too loud  - about 1:25 into the clip it gets quite gusty windy!

"Every few hundred years in Western history there occurs a sharp transformation. Within a few short decades society - its worldview, its basic values, its social and political structures, its arts, its key institutions - rearranges itself, and the people born then cannot even imagine a world in which their grandparents lived and into which their parents were born, We are currently living through such a transformation"

Peter Drucker, "The Post-Capitalist Society" Chapter 1, 1993

In "The Future of Money" former Belgian central banker Bernard Lietaer suggests two examples of Drucker's "sharp transformation".

First the invention of printing, and the unimaginable change it brought about in the literacy and therefore intellectual and political influence of a large part of the population from whom books were previously too remote. The ramifications of such a change included the Reformation and its huge upheavals as nations moved away from Rome, gave primacy to their own languages, and permitted scientific scholarship previously zealously suppressed by the Vatican.

Second, the invention of the steam engine which accelerated the process of urbanization, global trade in manufactures, created a working class steeped first in poverty, oppression and misery, and then rising up with revolutionary fervour.

Lietaer, following Drucker's suggestion, suggests that the next epochal change is on us. This time he paints a picture of four great movements that he describes as huge pistons pushing towards the same centre point, and that our reaction to these movements could push us to ever greater social inequity and environmental degradation to the disadvantage of future generations or to what he calls "sustainable abundance". His four great pistons are all too evident already: climate change, an ageing population, monetary instability and the advent of the super-connected information age.

So, you'll have spotted that this actually has nothing to do with the recent book from which I've shamelessly pinched the title. I haven't read it, and it appears now to be on reprint or something as Amazon can only offer 4-6 weeks delivery, but I will no doubt find it interesting once it arrives. But the point is that this epochal change will necessitate a reinvention of the state, the nation state, and probably every nation state on the planet.

Many of the institutions, commercial and governmental at least, that we have today were forged precisely because communication and information flow between disconnected markets was difficult. They are vehicles in which we put our trust when dealing with people and businesses we could not know personally. Even money itself is a construct that enables us to trust dealings with one another, a mechanism by which someone who sells us something can give us credit without knowing too much about us.

The information age changes all of this. The synopsis of David Cameron's Google speech yesterday at ConservativeHome does pinpoint the sort of changes we have seen in information flow and how they have been reflected in changes in the mode of government or, to use their word, bureaucracy. But it goes so much further than they seem to conceive (or maybe they're just trying not to scare the Tory horses too much).

The internet and other communication technologies enable us vastly to expand the networks of people whom we know well enough to form an opinion about whether we trust them or not. Look at things like e-Bay, where many participants rely on recommendations from others when making decisions about whom to trade with. An operation like e-Bay could just as well work in fact with a new, corporate, common currency into and out of which people trade other currencies as they need to. In a different vein, bringing new participants into the global economy, look at things like Kiva, the internet based microfinance scheme where people from all over the developing world can pitch for micro-loans from investors the world over to help them set up or develop their businesses.

On a more day-to-day level we have seen the internet make trade "arbitrage" available to the individual consumer - we can now search the web for the best prices in many goods and in different currencies. There is simply less of a need for national currencies. When, as we are frequently promised, we no longer need cash even for small transactions, it will not matter what currency our bank account is denominated in, so long as timely information allows us to convert it at the till into something the seller wants - which may even not have to be "money" in the conventional sense at all.

The internet is also radically changing the way we could choose to work, even if not many of us have so far done so. We could choose to live on a desert island with an internet connection and still work for our tech firm in Britain, or vice versa, we could retreat to our village virtual workplace and carry out open heart surgery on a patient in Tonga. Where do we get paid for these different patterns of working, and in what - Tesco vouchers anyone, after all you can pretty much buy anything you'd need there if you want to? How would a government know, except through every more intrusive surveillance of our affairs, what our incomes are, where they ought to be taxed and so on?

What does a state have left, if it no longer has control of information about its citizens' earnings and trading patterns? And when we can trade with smaller and smaller businesses around the world because of our widened networks of trust, what does the global corporation have left to keep us buying from them? This was the great hope of the nineteenth century anarchists, libertarians and mutualists who hoped for an end to the money monopoly held by states and bankers, and to government protectionism, which would drive down the returns to capital and drive up the returns to labour.

In the light of these huge potential changes in the ways we work, socialise, trade and trust we have the opportunity to look again at the argument, that once seemed so settled in the early part of the twentieth century, the great Liberal reform era, for truly free trade over protectionism. Individual choice over state intervention. If there is a role for the state in all of this, it is in trying to ensure that we all have fair access to the media of such a new economy - communications and delivery networks.